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CAN HIGH RESERVES OFFSET WEAK FUNDAMENTALS?:  




Apart from exchange rate objectives which have resulted in reserve 
accumulation as a side effect, Asian countries have chosen explicitly to 
build up reserves at least in part for precautionary motives. This paper 
explores the issue of optimal precautionary demand for reserves by a 
central bank within a context of a simple analytical model. The model 
suggests that, in general, high reserves can help offset moderately weak 
fundamentals. However, if fundamentals are sufficiently weak, no level of 
reserves will be able to counterbalance the weak fundamentals. This is 
broadly consistent with the escape clause based second-generation models 
of currency crisis. 
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1.   Introduction 
An important element of the ongoing global macroeconomic imbalances is the 
large and growing stock-pile of international reserves by Asian economies. To be sure, 
between end 1990 and 2004 international reserves (excluding gold) in Asia rose from 
US$ 400 billion to US$ 2600 billion (Figure 1). Asia’s share of global reserves 
correspondingly rose from about 40 percent in 1990 to 65 percent by 2004. Part of the 
motivation for the reserve accumulation may derive from a deep-rooted mercantilist 
desire by Asian governments to maintain undervalued exchange rates and bolster 
domestic employment, as well as a general reluctance to forsake firm US dollar pegged 
regimes (China, Malaysia, Hong Kong)
1. Apart from these exchange rate objectives 
which have resulted in rapid reserve accumulation as a side effect, Asian countries have 
chosen explicitly to build up reserves for precautionary or insurance motives (Bird and 
Rajan, 2003). For instance, Aizenman and Marion (2003) have noted that the ￿behavior 
has changed since the Asian financial crisis￿, and go on to suggest that the ￿recent build-
up of large international reserve holdings in a number of Asian emerging markets may 
represent precautionary holdings￿ (p.11). 
  Precautionary motives for accumulating reserves encompass both crisis 
management and crisis prevention. The former refers to the role of reserves in reducing 
the extent of exchange rate (and output) adjustment if a crisis does happen. This in turn 
could refer either to (a) the ability to finance underlying payments imbalances, or (b) 
provide liquidity in the face of runs on the currency. Crisis prevention refers broadly to a 
reduction in the incidence of a crisis. The argument here is simply that, other things equal, 
                                                 
1 This apart, it is also possible that countries that have loosened their pegged regimes still choose 
to hold high reserve levels as they are viewed as a sign of creditworthiness, hence reducing the 
degree of exchange rate volatility. Some evidence of this thesis is offered by Hviding et al. (2004).   
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high reserves may be viewed as a sign of strength of an economy, thus reducing the 
chances of a run against the currency. Indeed, many studies have confirmed that high 
reserves to short term debt or money supply ratios have consistently stood out as being 
robust predictors of a crisis (Bird and Rajan, 2003, De Beaufort Wijnholds and Kapetyn, 
2001, and Willett et al 2004). Some have even suggested that sufficiently high levels of 
reserves can fully offset weak fundamentals (Sachs et al., 1996). Counterbalancing these 
precautionary motives for holding reserves are their high opportunity costs which arise 
from substituting high yielding domestic assets for lower yielding foreign ones. These 
costs can be proxied as the difference between the domestic marginal product of capital 
and the returns obtained on the reserve assets (usually US Treasuries)
2.  
  This paper has a rather modest objective. It attempts to develop a simple 
optimizing model to determine the optimal reserve holdings by a country looking to 
minimize the net costs of holding reserves. In so doing the paper also attempts to 
determine the validity of the Sachs et al. (1996) assertion that sufficiently high levels of 
reserves can compensate for weak fundamentals.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the 
basic structure of the model and solution. Section 3 discusses the nexus between weak 
fundamentals and optimal reserve size. Section 4 offers some concluding observations. 
 
 
                                                 
2 Two caveats are in order. One, it is sometimes noted that reserves could be used to pay down 
external debt. The difference of the interest rate paid on the external debt and from that earned on 
reserve assets could be a proxy for opportunity cost of holding reserves. Two, another set of costs 
of persistent reserve accumulation arises due to the inflationary consequences of excess liquidity 
and/or the costs of mopping up the liquidity, i.e. sterilization (for instance, see Kletzer and 
Spiegel, 2004).  
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2. The  Model 
2.1  Basic Structure and Assumptions 
The basic model structure is fairly simple and intuitive. We assume a risk averse 
central bank￿s aim is to minimize the expected total costs to the economy from holding 
international reserves (R) which is its choice variable
3.  
As noted, the major precautionary benefits from holding reserves are twofold. 
One, a stockpile of reserves may reduce the probability of a crisis occurring in the first 
instance, i.e. crisis prevention role. Two, reserves help reduce the adjustment costs if a 
crisis does occur, i.e. crisis management role. 
In other words: 
 
R C RC PC TC + =            ( 1 )  
 
TC: expected total costs. 
R: level of international reserves.  
c C : unit cost associated with the crisis, measured as the output loss, viz. the difference of 
the output levels between normal times and crises. 
R C : unit opportunity cost of holding reserves. We assume this to be constant. 
P: probability of crises which is a function of R as well as a vector of weak fundamentals 
( X ). In addition, X P > 0 and R P < 0. 
 
                                                 
3 For an early cost-benefit analysis on the issue of optimal reserves, see Bassat and Gottlieb 
(1992). For a more recent model of precautionary reserve demand which links the level of 
reserves to the reduction in the possibility of output collapse due to sovereign partial default, see 
Aizenman et al (2004).    
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The output loss ( C C ) is assumed to be the difference of the output levels between 
normal times and crisis. 
  
C N C Y Y C − =           ( 2 )  
 
N Y : the output level in normal times; and  C Y : the output level in crises times. 
 
We assume, for simplicity, that the only input of production is capital (K): 
 
) (K F Y =                                 (3) 
 














We need to make explicit the costs of a crisis. Assume that during normal times K 
= K . To maintain a degree of generality, we assume that a crisis -- bad state of nature -- 
acts as a negative supply shock in the sense that either the extent of capital stock 
deteriorates, or the average productivity of capital declines (A)
4. However, for a given 
crisis, the bad state of nature is inversely related to the amount of reserves. In other 
words, the extent of impact of the bad state of nature is lower the higher is the stock of 
reserves. So: 
 
                                                 
4 Alternatively, one could define a crisis as something that reduces the extent of capital reversal 
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where,  0 < ) (R A  < 1 and  R A  > 0
5. 
 
Plugging eqs. (3) and (4) into (2), we can express the output loss as a function of 
reserves: 
 
] ) ( [ ) ( K R A F K F Y Y C C N C − = − =        ( 5 )  
 
From eq. (5) we have: 
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CC .          ( 6 )  
 
Eq. (6) reveals a negative relationship between the reserve holding and output loss during 
a crisis.  
 
2.2 Model  Solution 
The central bank minimizes the loss function (eq. 1) so as to choose the optimal 
reserve. The first order condition of this minimization problem is: 
 
                                                 
5  Following footnote 3, if we interpret the shock in terms of capital reversals (CR), viz. the 
difference of capital flows in crisis and previous inflows, then  K R A K K CR C ] 1 ) ( [ − = − = .                             
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.         ( 7 )  
 
For concreteness, we make use of some specific functional forms. Let the 
probability function of crisis be: 
 
) ; ( R X P P =  
]. / exp[      X R − =
          ( 8 )  
Following Sachs et al. (1996), X  usually consists of at least four variables, viz. 
current account deficit (CAD), lending boom (LB), real exchange rate appreciation (RER), 
and the size of external debt (STD)
6. The probability function reveals that with the 
accumulation of higher levels of reserves (R), the probability of crisis will converge to 0. 
If the level of reserves is close to 0, the probability of crisis will increase, peaking at 1. 
Meanwhile, if the weak fundamentals (X) are close to 0, the probability of crisis will 
decrease to 1; and if the weak fundamentals (X) are significantly high, the probability of a 
crisis will increase to 1.  
  From eq. 8 we have: 
 
  X P X R X
R
P
/ )] / )[exp( / 1 ( − = − − =
∂
∂
       ( 9 )  
  
                                                 
6 For instance,  STD RER LB CAD X η γ β α + + + = . However, in view of the possible tradeoffs 
between the various variables, there is not yet a clear indication of the best way of interacting 
them to come up with a suitable vector of weak fundamentals (Willett et al., 2004).  
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  In order to solve for R*, assume 
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The left hand side of eq. 13 can be interpreted as the marginal benefit of holding 
reserves, while the right hand side is the marginal cost of reserves. In other words, an 
optimizing central bank will continue to build up reserves as long as the marginal benefits 
of doing exceed the marginal costs (opportunity costs). While this result is intuitive, the 
contribution of the simple model is to flesh out the factors that impact the marginal 
benefits which in turn allow us to analyze the nexus between weak fundamentals and 
reserve holdings. We elaborate on this issue in the next section. 
 
3.  Findings and Implications 
  While the right hand side of eq. 13 is assumed constant, the left hand side. is 
decreasing in R
7. Given this, we have the following proposition -- the sufficient condition 





X ≤ .  Why? 
  We can set the domain of the left hand side as [0, ∞). If we set the initial R as 0, 
then, the output loss 
a
C K C = , and the marginal output loss,  0 = λ . Thus, the left hand 









X ≤  can ensure there 
                                                 
7   Taking the partial derivative w.r.t. R we see that as R  rises, the lower is 
1 ) / (
/
) 1 (   and     ,     ], ) 1 ( 1 [     ,
− − − − −
−
− − −
a R X R R a a R
a X R
e e K a e
X
K e . All these terms are positive. Therefore, 
with the increase of R, all the terms on the left hand side of eq. 13 decrease. In other words, the 




is at least one level of R such that the left hand side is greater than or equal to right hand 
side of eq. 13.  
The proposition can be reinterpreted as follows. If the fundamentals (X) are 






X > , there may not be any interior solution to R*. In other words, for extremely 
weak fundamentals no amount of reserves can help prevent a crisis from occurring 
(Figure 2).  





X < , there is an interior solution for R*. Worsening 
fundamentals (i.e. rising X) will lead to higher probability of crisis. This in turn, increases 
the marginal benefit of reserve holdings at any given reserve level. Therefore, the MB 
schedule will shift up from R* to R** (see Figure 3)
8. So generally, as fundamentals get 
weaker, countries need to hold correspondingly more reserves, and high reserves can 
offset weak fundamentals only if the fundamentals are not ￿too weak￿. 
 
4.    Concluding Remarks 
This paper has explored the issue of optimal reserve holdings by a central bank 
within a context of a simple analytical model. An important limitation of the model arises 
from the assumption of a constant opportunity cost of reserves. More realistically, insofar 
as these costs can be proxied as the opportunity cost, it is important to consider the 
impact of changes in the capital stock and production on the marginal costs of reserve 
holdings. This notwithstanding, the model suggests that in general, high reserves can help 
                                                 
8 Annex 1 derives the specific conditions under which the MB curve rises with X.   
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offset weak fundamentals. However, if fundamentals are sufficiently weak no level of 
reserves will be able to offset the weak fundamentals. In other words, for ￿hopelessly 
weak￿ fundamentals, a crisis is inevitable and reserves cannot act as a substitute for 
domestic policy reforms and adjustments
9. Conversely, if fundamentals are ￿sufficiently 
strong￿, a crisis will never occur. However, if fundamentals are within a certain range ￿ 
zone of vulnerability ￿ other things equal, higher levels of reserves may help offset the 
negative impact of weak fundamentals. With fundamentals in the vulnerable zone, high 
reserves could have a powerful effect in protecting against crises. This also suggests that 
reserve needs should be related to the state of fundamentals in a non-linear manner. 
While this may contradict the conclusion of Sachs et al. (1996), it is broadly consistent 
with the critique by Nitithanprapas and Willett (2000) and Willett et al. (2004), and is 
also consistent with the escape clause based second-generation models of currency crisis 
(Obstfeld, 1994, 1996 and Rajan, 2001). 
Returning to the issue of reserve stockpiling in Asia. The fact that a number of 
Asian countries are consciously looking to use part of their accumulated reserves to 
finance physical infrastructure (e.g. India and Thailand) or strengthen their financial 
institutions (e.g. Korea and China), seems to indicate that they have reached a level at 
which their perceived marginal benefits have been outweighed by their marginal costs. 
This in turn suggests that the recent build up of reserves in Asia has been more due to 
exchange rate motivations (i.e. mercantilism or general commitment to pegged regimes 
which are undervalued) rather than a conscious attempt to buy ￿insurance cover￿.  
                                                 
9 Indeed, first generation crisis models imply that if fundamentals are sufficiently weak such that 






This Annex derives the conditions under which the Marginal benefit (MB) curve rises 
with X
10. Taking the first derivative of the left hand side of eq. 13 w.r.t. X derives:  
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10  While not shown here, the impact of a change of X on the slope of the MB curve (i.e. 
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Figure 2 
Reserves Insufficient to Offset Weak Fundamentals 












































































Figure 3  
Worsening Fundamentals Compensated for by Higher Reserves 









CIES DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
 
The CIES Discussion Paper series provides a means of circulating promptly papers of 
interest to the research and policy communities and written by staff and visitors 
associated with the Centre for International Economic Studies (CIES) at the Adelaide 
University. Its purpose is to stimulate discussion of issues of contemporary policy 
relevance among non-economists as well as economists. To that end the papers are 
non-technical in nature and more widely accessible than papers published in specialist 
academic journals and books. (Prior to April 1999 this was called the CIES Policy 
Discussion Paper series. Since then the former CIES Seminar Paper series has been 
merged with this series.) 
 
Copies of CIES Policy Discussion Papers may be downloaded from our Web site 
at http://www.adelaide.edu.au/cies/ or are available by contacting the Executive 
Assistant, CIES, School of Economics, Adelaide University, SA 5005 AUSTRALIA. Tel: 
(+61 8) 8303 5672, Fax: (+61 8) 8223 1460, Email: cies@adelaide.edu.au. Single copies 
are free on request; the cost to institutions is US$5.00 overseas or A$5.50 (incl. GST) in 
Australia each including postage and handling. 
 
For a full list of CIES publications, visit our Web site at 
http://www.adelaide.edu.au/cies/ or write, email or fax to the above address for our List 
of Publications by CIES Researchers, 1989 to 1999 plus updates. 
 
0509  Li, Jie and Rajan, Ramkishen S., ￿Can High Reserves Offset Weak Fundamentals? A Simple 
Model of Precautionary Demand for Reserves￿, June 2005 
0508  Sugema, Iman, ￿The Determinants of Trade Balance and Adjustment to the Crisis in 
Indonesia￿, June 2005 
0507  Ouyang, Alice Y.  and Rajan, Ramkishen S., ￿Monetary Sterilization in China Since the 1990s: 
How Much and How Effective?￿, June 2005 
0506  Sugema, Iman and Chowdhury, Anis, ￿Aid and Fiscal Behaviour in Indonesia: The Case of a 
lazy Government￿, May 2005 
0505  Chowdhury, Anis and Sugema, Iman, ￿How Significant and Effective has Foreign Aid to 
Indonesia been?￿, May 2005 
0504  Siregar, Reza Y. and Pontines, Victor, ￿Incidences of Speculative Attacks on Rupiah During 
The Pre- and Post-1997 Financial Crisis￿, May 2005 
0503  Cavoli, Tony and Rajan, Ramkishen S., ￿Have Exchange Rate Regimes in Asia Become More 
Flexible Post Crisis? Re-visiting the evidence.￿ January 2005 
0502  Cavoli, Tony, ￿Sterilisation, Capital Mobility and Interest Rate Determination for East Asia￿ 
February 2005 
0501  Marrewijk, Charles Van, ￿Basic Exchange Rate Theories￿ February 2005 
0415  Griffiths, William and Webster, Elizabeth. ￿The Determinants of Research and Development 
and Intellectual Property Usage among Australian Companies, 1989 to 2002￿ December 2004 
0414  Marrewijk, Charles Van and Koen G. Berden, ￿On the static and dynamic costs of trade 
restrictions￿ November2004 
0413  Anderson, Kym , Lee Ann Jackson and Chantal Pohl Nielsen ￿Genetically Modified Rice 
Adoption￿ November 2004 
0412  Anderson, Kym , ￿The Challenge of Reducing Subsidies and Trade Barriers￿ November 2004 
0411  Anderson, Kym and Lee Ann Jackson, ￿Standards, Trade and Protection: the case of GMOs￿, 
November 2004  
 
19
0410  Anderson, Kym, Richard Damania and Lee Ann Jackson, ￿Trade, Standards, and the Political 
Economy of Genetically Modified Food￿, November 2004 
0409  Anderson, Kym and Lee Ann Jackson, ￿Some Implications of GM Food Technology Policies 
for Sub-Saharan Africa￿, November 2004 
0408  Anderson, Kym and Lee Ann Jackson, ￿GM Food Crop Technology and Trade Measures: 
Some economic Implications for Australia and New Zealand￿ November 2004 
0407  Marrewijk, Charles Van, ￿An Introduction to International Money and Foreign Exchange 
Markets￿, October 2004 
0406  Pontines, Victor and Reza Y. Siregar, ￿The Yen, The US dollar and  
The Speculative Attacks Against The Thailand Baht￿, October 2004 
0405  Siregar, Reza and William E. James, ￿Designing an Integrated Financial Supervision Agency: 
Selected Lessons and Challenges for Indonesia￿, October 2004 
0404  Pontines, Victor and Reza Y. Siregar, ￿Successful and Unsuccessful Attacks:Evaluating the 
Stability of the East Asian Currencies￿, August 2004 
0403  Siregar, Reza and Ramkishen S. Rajan ￿Exchange Rate Policy and Reserve Management in 
Indonesia in the Context of East Asian Monetary Regionalism ￿, August 2004 
0402  Siregar, Reza ￿Interest Spreads and Mandatory Credit Allocations: 
Implications on Bank Loans to Small Businesses in Indonesia￿, January 2004. 
0401  Cavoli, Tony., Ramkishen S. Rajan, and Reza Siregar ￿A Survey of Financial Integration in 
East Asia: How Far?  How Much Further to Go?￿, January 2004. 
0323  Rajan, Ramkishen., Reza Siregar and, Graham Bird ￿Examining the Case for Reserve Pooling 
in East Asia: Empirical Analysis￿, September 2003. 
0322  Chantal Pohl Nielsen and Kym Anderson ￿Golden Rice and the Looming GMO Trade Debate: 
Implication for the Poor￿, July 2003. 
0321  Anderson, Kym ￿How Can Agricultural Trade Reform Reduce Poverty?￿ July 2003. 
0320  Damania, Richard and Erwin Bulte ￿Resources for Sale: Corruption, Democracy and the 
Natural Resource Curse￿, July 2003. 
0319  Anderson, Kym ￿Agriculture and Agricultural Policies in China and India Post-Uruguay 
Round￿, July 2003. 
0318  Bentick, Brian L. and Mervyn K Lewis, ￿Real Estate Speculation as a Source of Banking and 
Currency Instability: Lessons from the Asian Crisis￿, July 2003. 
0317  Barreto, Raul A. and Kaori Kobayashi, ￿Open Economy Schumpeterian Growth￿, May 2003 
0316  Barreto, Raul A. and Kaori Kobayashi, ￿Economic Integration and Endogenous Growth 
Revisited: Pro-competitive Gains from Trade in Goods and the Long Run Benefits to the 
Exchange of Ideas￿, May 2003. 
0315  Wilson, Patrick J. and Ralf Zurbruegg, ￿Trends and Spectral Response:  An Examination of the 
US Realty Market￿, May 2003. 
0314  Esho, Neil and Anatoly Kirievsky, Damian Ward and Ralf Zurbruegg, ￿Law and the Demand 
for Property-Casualty Insurance Consumption￿, May 2003. Since published in Journal of Risk 
and Insurance, June 2004 v71 i2 p265(19) 
0313  Wilson, Patrick J. and Ralf Zurbruegg, ￿Does it Pay to Diversify Real Estate Assets? - A 
Literary Perspective￿, May 2003. 
0312  Rajan, Ramkishen, ￿Taxing International Currency Flows: A Financial Safeguard or Financial 
Bonanza?￿, April 2003. 
0311  Rajan, Ramkishen, ￿Financial Crisis, Capital Outflows and Policy Responses: Simple 
Analytics and Examples from East Asia￿, April 2003. 
0310  Cavoli, Tony and Ramkishen Rajan, ￿Exchange Rate Arrangements for East Asia Post-Crisis: 
Examining the Case for Open Economy Inflation Targeting￿, April 2003. 
 